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Herd Behavior and Investment
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model of herd behavior in
investment. Managers mimic the investment decisions of other managers, in
the process ignoring their private information about the attractiveness of
various alternatives. Although this behavior is inefficient from a social
standpoint, it is rational from the perspective of managers who are
concerned about their reputations in the labor market. We discuss
applications of the model to corporate investment, the stock market, and
decisionmaking within firms.
I. Introduction
A basic tenet of classical economic theory is that investment
decisions reflect agents' rationally formed expectations; decisions are
made using all available information in an efficient manner. A contrasting
view is that investment is also driven by group psychology, which weakens
the link between information and market outcomes. In The General Theory,
Keynes (1936) expresses skepticism about the ability and inclination of
"long-term investors' to buck market trends to ensure full efficiency. In
his view, investors may be reluctant to act according to their own
information and beliefs, fearing that their contrarian behavior will damage
their reputations as sensible decision-makers:
" . .. it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes
the public interest, who will in practice come in for most
criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by committees or
boards or banks. For it is in the essence of his behavior that
he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of
average opinion. If he is successful, that will only confirm the
general belief in his rashness; and if in the short-run he is
unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much
mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation
to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally."
Thus Keynes suggests that professional managers will follow the herd'
if they are concerned about how others will assess their ability to make
sound judgements. There are a number of settings in which this kind of
herd behavior might have important implications. One example is the stock
market, for which the following explanation of the pre-October 1987 bull
market is often repeated: The consensus among professional money managers
was that price levels were too high--the market was, in their opinion, more
likely to go down rather than up. However, few money managers were eager
to sell their equity holdings. If the market did continue to go up, they
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were afraid of being perceived as lone fools for missing out on the ride.
On the other hand, in the more likely event of a market decline, there
would be comfort in numbers--how bad could they look if everybody else had
suffered the same fate?
The same principle can apply to corporate investment, when a number of
companies are investing in similar assets. In Selling Money, Gwynne (1986)
documents problems of herd behavior in banks' lending policies towards
LDC's. Discussing the incentives facing a credit analyst, he writes:
"Part of Herrick's job--an extremely important part as far
as the bank was concerned--was to retrieve information about the
countries in which the bank did business. But this function
collided head on with what Herrick was actually doing out
there...His job would never be measured by how correct his
country risk analysis was. At the very least, Herrick was simply
doing what hundreds of other larger international banks had
already done, and any ultimate blame for poor forecasting would
be shared by tens of thousands of bankers around the world; this
was one of the curious benefits of following the herd."
This paper presents a theoretical model that is consistent with the
kind of herd behavior discussed above. Managers mimic the investment
decisions of other managers, in the process ignoring their private
information about the attractiveness of various alternatives. Although
this behavior is inefficient from a social standpoint, it is rational from
the perspective of managers who are concerned about their reputations in
the labor market.
Our model is a 'learning" model, similar in spirit to one studied by
Holmstrom (1982). Like us, he considers a situation in which managers use
investment decisions to manipulate the labor market's inferences regarding
their ability, where ability represents an aptitude for making decisions.
This definition of ability contrasts with one where ability adds to
physical productivity, as in Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) as well as
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in another part of Holmstrom (1982). The key difference between our model
and these others is that ours is most interesting when there is more than
one manager, whereas theirs are single-manager models.1
We assume that there are two types of managers: "smart" ones who
receive informative signals about the value of an investment, and dumb"
ones, who receive purely noisy signals. Initially, neither the managers
themselves nor the labor market can identify the types. However, after the
managers have made an investment decision, the labor market can update its
beliefs, based on two pieces of evidence: 1) whether the manager made a
·good' investment (i.e., whether he made money); 2) whether the manager's
behavior was similar to or different than that of other managers.
The first piece of evidence will not be used exclusively, since
success is only a noisy indicator of ability--on any given draw, all smart
managers could get unlucky and receive misleading signals. Hence the
second piece of evidence is important as well. The key point is that smart
managers will tend to receive correlated signals (since they are all
observing a piece of the same truth'), while dumb ones will not (they
simply observe uncorrelated noise). Consequently, if one manager mimics
the behavior of others, this will suggest to the labor market that he has
received a signal that is correlated with theirs, and is more likely to be
smart. In contrast, a manager who takes a contrarian position will (all
else being equal) be perceived as more likely to be dumb. Thus even if a
manager's private information tells him that an investment has a negative
expected value, he may pursue it if others before him have. Conversely, he
may refuse investments that he perceives as having positive expected value
if others before him have also done so.
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These points are further developed in the four sections following this
one. In Section II, we present the structure and assumptions of the model.
The basic results on the existence of herding equilibria are developed in
three propositions in Section III. In Section IV, we elaborate on the
implications of our model for corporate investment, the stock market, and
decisionmaking within firms. Finally, Section V contains concluding
remarks.
II. The Model
The model that is developed in this section applies more literally to
the example of corporate investment discussed above than it does to the
stock market. We assume that the investments under consideration are
available in perfectly elastic supply at a given price. This allows us to
avoid explicitly considering the feedback from investment demand to prices,
thereby simplifying the analysis considerably. In Section IV, we will
discuss at greater length how we think our results carry over to the stock
market, where this assumption is clearly not appropriate. For the time
being, however, it may help for the reader interested in concreteness to
bear in mind the following story: Our managers" are in charge of capital
investment at industrial firms, and they are each considering expanding
capacity by building a similar type of plant. The value of the plant will
depend on the state of the economy in the future, and each manager receives
a signal that gives him some information about this future state. The
question we address is the following: how well does the aggregate level of
investment reflect all of the available information?
III
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a) Timing and Information Structure
The economy consists of two firms, firm A and firm B, run by managers
we call A and B respectively. These managers invest sequentially, with A
moving first. At date 1, manager A decides whether or not to build the
plant. There are two possible states for the economy at date 3: either
the economy will be in the high" state, in which case the plant will yield
a profit (net of investment expense and discounting) of xH > 0; or the
economy will be in the low" state, in which case the plant will yield a
net profit of xL < 0. The prior probabilities for these two states are a
and (1 - a) respectively. The state of the economy is publicly obervable,
even if neither manager decides to invest.
In making his decision, manager A has access to a signal, which can
take on one of two values: G (a good' signal); or B (a bad" signal).
Interpreting this signal is a bit complicated, because the manager does not
know if he is smart" or dumb." If he is smart, which occurs with prior
probability , the signal is informative--that is, a good signal is more
likely to occur prior to the high state than prior to the low state.
Formally, we have:
(1) Prob (sGIxH, smart) p;
(2) Prob (GIxL, smart) q < p.
If the manager is dumb, however, which occurs with probability
(1 - ), he receives completely uninformative signals--he is as likely to
receive G prior to the high state as prior to the low state, so that:
(3) Prob (GIxH, dumb) - Prob(sGIxL, dumb) z.
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We make the assumption that the ex-ante distribution of signals is the same
for both smart and dumb managers--both are equally likely to receive G, so
that the actual signal received does not communicate any information about
types by itself. (In other words, the only difference is that G really
means something for smart managers--but they don't receive it more often.)
This amounts to assuming that: Prob (sGlsmart) - Prob (sGidumb), or:
(4) z - ap + (1 - a)q.
Given that the manager does not know if he is smart or dumb, a
straightforward application of Bayes' law allows us to calculate the
probabilities he attaches to the high state after receiving the good and
bad signals:
(5) Prob (XHISG) - G P + (1 - )z a;
(6) Prob (xH{S B ) B - p) + (1 - )( - z)
' ~ (1 -z) ~
In order to make the investment problem interesting, we assume that
the investment is attractive if a good signal has been received, but not if
a bad signal has:
(7) GXH + (1 - G)XL > 0 > BXH + (1 - B)XL
After manager A has made his investment decision at date 1, manager B
makes his decision at date 2. Manager B also has access to a private
signal. In addition, he can also observe whether or not firm A has decided
to invest. This is valuable information--even in an ideal world (i.e., one
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without reputational concerns), firm B's investment decision should be
partially influenced by what firm A does. Our main point is that with
reputational concerns, firm B's manager pays too much attention to what
firm A has done, and too little to his private signal.2
Like manager A, firm B's manager can be either smart or dumb. If one
manager is smart and the other is dumb, their signals are drawn
independently from the binomial distributions given in equations (1) - (3).
Similarly, if both are dumb, their signals are drawn independently--so
that, for example, the probability that two dumb managers both observe s G
is z2.
However, if both managers are smart, they are assumed to observe
exactly the same signal. Thus the probability that two smart managers both
observe s G when the true state is xH is p. (As opposed to the p2 that
would prevail if smart managers received independent draws from the
distributions described in (1) and (2)). This feature is crucial to our
analysis. It can be generalized somewhat, to allow the draws to be
imperfectly correlated. However, if the signals of smart managers are
drawn independently from the distributions, our results will fail to go
through.
Heuristically, we require smart managers' prediction errors to be at
least partially correlated with each other. Although this feature may seem
slightly unnatural given the current set-up and notation, it amounts to
nothing more than saying that there are systematically unpredictable
factors affecting the future state that nobody can know anything about.
For example, we might model the outcome of the state draw as being driven
by the sum of two random variables, u and v. If u + v > 0, then xH
obtains. If u + v < 0, then xL obtains. Our assumption is equivalent to
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allowing smart managers to observe u but not v. (As suggested above, we
could generalize to allow each manager to observe u perturbed by
independent noise, so long as we retained the unobservability of the common
component v.)
The importance of a common component to the prediction error for smart
managers follows logic similar to that seen in tournament models of effort
elicitation (e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)). If prediction errors are
independent, the labor market can, in our model, efficiently update on
ability using only individual performance--i.e., whether the manager picked
a successful investment. Analogously, in a tournaments model, if the
agents face independent shocks to output, optimal contracts evaluate the
agent based only on individual absolute performance. However, to the
extent that errors are correlated, there will be an informational gain from
comparing agents, and looking at relative performance. In our model, one
will not wish to evaluate too harshly a manager who picks a bad investment,
if his colleague's similar choice suggests that they were both victims of a
completely unpredictable factor.
Thus it is the common component to prediction errors that gives this
model its bite, by causing some inferential weight to be placed on the
similarity of managers' decisions. Perversely, the existence this extra
channel of inference actually leads to ex-ante reductions in
efficiency--just the opposite of the result seen in the literature on
tournaments. This is because here, managers will attempt to actively
manipulate their investment decisions in such a way as to bias the
inference process in their favor. Even if the market recognizes that they
will be engaging in this manipulation, it will continue to exist in
equilibrium.3
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b) Managerial Obiectives
Our next step is to specify the objective functions of the managers.
In a first-best world, the managers would seek only to maximize the
expected returns on investment, and would invest anytime their information
(either from their private signal or from observing the other managers)
indicated that investing had positive expected value.
In our model, managers' investment decisions enable the labor market
to update its beliefs about their ability. We denote by the market's
revised assessment of the probability that a manager is smart.
In order to establish a simple relationship between managers'
objectives and , we make several simplifying assumptions. Following
Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), we assume that: 1) the investment
game will be replayed once more after date 3; 2) at this point there will
be no further reason to build a reputation, so managers invest efficiently;
3) competition leads managers' spot market wages to be set to the economic
value of their ability.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that, for a wide range of
parameter values in our model, the expected return on the investment
opportunity is linear in the manager's ability (as measured by ) if the
manager invests efficiently. Hence the spot market wages referred to above
will be proportional to .4
We do not explicitly analyze contracting behavior in what follows.
Rather, we employ the no slavery' assumption (used by Holmstrom (1982) and
others) to claim that managers cannot be bound to their firms against their
will ex-post, so that any long-term contract that would pay some types less
than spot market wages in the second go-round of the investment game is
infeasible.
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Since their future wages are thus linear in , managers will have some
incentive to generate high values of , rather than to invest efficiently
in the first go-round. Of course, it is still possible that short-term
incentive contracts could serve at least partially to align managerial and
firm interests, by specifying a profit-contingent wage in the first
go-round of the investment game. Thus, in principle, it seems reasonable
to believe that managers would be induced to act so as to maximize some
weighted average of expected profits and their reputations. However, this
more general formulation leads to the same basic conclusions that obtain if
managers care only about reputation--although naturally, more weight on
expected profits will tend to attenuate the inefficiencies. For the sake
of starkness and notational simplicity, we leave expected profits out of
the managerial objective function. Later, in discussing our results we
will briefly touch on how they would be altered by adding expected profits
back into managerial consideration.5
The last assumption we make is that managers are risk neutral, so that
their objective function simplifies to maximizing expected wages. This is
equivalent to maximizing the expected value of .
III. Herding Equilibria
a) Comparison with Efficient Investment Decisions
In order to economize on notation, we set p - 1 - q. We also set
a - h. Taken together, these simplifications imply that z - from
equation (4). For the time being, we leave the sign of (xH + xL)
unspecified, so that the investment can have an ex-ante expected value that
is either positive or negative.
II
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As a benchmark, we first derive the optimal decision rules in a
first-best world with no reputational concerns. Manager A would invest if
and only if he observed sG--this is a consequence of the assumption in
equation (7). Thus manager B can infer manager A's signal from his
investment decision.
If manager B observes B after firm A has invested, he knows that the
total information set is (G, B)* Given our symmetry assumptions this
implies that the probability of the high state, prob(xHisG, B ) - . Thus
the investment decision will hinge on the sign of (xH + L)--if this
quantity is positive, manager B will invest, and if not, he won't.
Similarly, if firm A doesn't invest, and manager B observes G , the
investment decision turns on the same criterion of whether (xH + L) > 0.
Clearly, in the first best, the order in which the information arrives is
irrelevant to manager B's decision. If one manager observes sG and the
other sees B, manager B's decision will be the same regardless of whether
the sG signal was received by him or by manager A.
With reputational considerations, the decision rules will be
different. When manager A observes G and invests, manager B will also
invest, regardless of his signal and regardless of the sign of (xH + XL).
Hence if this signal is B and xH + xL < 0, the investment will be
inefficient. Conversely, if firm A doesn't invest, firm B never will
either, which is inefficient when manager B observes sG and xH + xL > 0.
Now the order in which information arrives is important to firm B's
decision--the same total information set of (sG , sB ) can lead it to invest
or not to invest, depending on whether the signal sG is received by the
first mover firm A or not.
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b) Equilibria with Reputational Concerns
We now examine the equilibria that exist when managers seek to
maximize the expected value of . For now, we focus on the decision rules
for the manager of firm B--all the continuation' equilibria that we look
at will have the manager of firm A behaving efficiently, by investing if
and only if he observes G . Later, we will establish that this efficient
behavior by firm A's manager is part of an equilibrium for the overall
game.
We develop our results through a series of propositions.
Proposition 1: There does not exist any continuation equilibrium in
which manager B's investment decision depends on the signal he observes.
Thus the only possible equilibria are those where manager B mimics manager
A regardless of the signal, or where manager B does the opposite of manager
A regardless of the signal.
The proof will be by contradiction. We start by conjecturing the
existence of the "separating" equilibrium described above.6 We then
determine the updating rules the labor market would use to calculate in
such an equilibrium. Finally, we show that given these updating rules,
rational managers will not wish to behave as posited in the equilibrium.
The revised ability assessments will be a function of the labor
market's conjectures about the signals observed by the managers as well as
the realized state of the world. Of course, only the managers observe
their signals, but in the putative separating equilibrium, there is a
one-to-one mapping from signals to actions. Thus for example, suppose the
separating equilibrium calls for each manager to invest if and only if he
III
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observes s G . Then if manager A doesn't invest and manager B does, the
market believes that manager A observed B and manager B observed G, and
it can do its updating based on these beliefs.
As noted above, the main focus of our analysis is manager B.
Continuing with the above example, suppose the high state was realized.
How would the market revise its prior about the manager's ability? Let
(sB, G , xH) denote this event, and let 8B, G , xH) be the revised prior.
By Bayes' rule, one can show that:
8 sB G e4 pe(l S ' 4( H pe(1 - ) + ((1 -)( )  )
- 2ep/(l + e)
The explanation for this result is as follows. There are three
possible configurations of managerial ability that could give rise to this
event: (dumb, smart); (smart, dumb); and (dumb, dumb). Note that (smart,
smart) is not possible since if this were the case, both managers would
have received the same signal, by virtue of our assumption that smart
managers' signals are perfectly correlated.
We wish to know the probability of (dumb, smart) conditional on the
event(sB,sG, H). If the configuration of talent is (dumb, smart), which
occurs with ex-ante probability (1 - ), the probability of (B, G ) in
state xH is p. This explains the numerator in (8). The denominator gives
in addition the probabilities of (s B, GIxH) if the configuration is
(smart, dumb) and (dumb, dumb). These are (1 - p) and respectively. By
symmetry, it is straightforward to show that (sG, B, xL) - 2p/(1 + )
also.
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The derivation of the other updating rules follow along similar lines.
They are listed below:
(9) e(sB, G, xL) - (sG , sB, xH) - 20(1 - p)/(l + );
2e(1 -p) + )(10) e(s B , sB, xH) - e(SG, sG, xL) 8(1 - ) + (1 - e) 2
MU = ep(1 + e)(11) e(B , sB, xL) = e(s G s G xH) 4ep + (1 - )2
Now, in order for our posited equilibrium to actually hold together,
it must be that managers find it in their interest to behave as assumed.
For example, suppose that manager A has observed B and has not invested.
Given the updating rules above, can it ever be rational for manager B to
invest upon observing G , but not invest upon observing B? Or will one
type of manager break" the equilibrium by deviating and attempting to fool
the market into thinking that he has received a different signal?
To answer these questions, the following probabilities must be
calculated:
(12) Prob (H]sB, G) -
(13) Prob (xHIS B sB ) 4e(1 - p)2+ (1 - e)2HiB' ~ - 40 + 2(1 - e)3 
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We can now check the rationality conditions that must hold for the
equilibrium to be viable. One of these is:
(14) (sB, G , x) Prob (xHIsB, G ) + (s B, sG, xL ) Prob (xLIS BI SG )
> (s B, s B , xH) Prob (xH[sB, G ) + (s B, sB, xL) Prob (LsB, SG)'
Inequality (14) represents the requirement that if manager B receives
signal G , he prefers to invest (and identify himself as someone who had
observed G), rather than not invest (and masquerade as someone who had
received signal B). Direct substitution from equations (8) - (12)
establishes that the inequality is violated--if manager B receives sG, he
will wish to deviate by mimicking firm A and not investing. A symmetric
argument establishes that if firm A has invested, there is also no
separating equilibrium. In this case, if manager B observes B , he will
deviate by mimicking firm A and also investing.
There are also potentially 'perverse' separating equilibria, where a
manager B invests if and only if he observes sB , rather than G . It can be
easily demonstrated using the same lines of reasoning that such equilibria
are also not viable. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
It is worth examining the updating rules in equations (8) - (11) to
gain some intuition for the forces that prevent the efficient equilibrium
from existing. Two main points emerge from these equations:
A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~First, (sB' 5G, XH) > "sB' sG, xL); and (sG, sG' x) >
8(sG, G, L). Holding the investment decision of manager A fixed, manager
B is indeed compensated for making 'absolutely' good decisions--for
investing prior to a realization of xH, as opposed to investing prior to a
realization of L.
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Second, however, the investment decision of manager A does have an
important externality effect. Holding the correctness of the investment
decision fixed, there is a higher payoff to manager B for imitating manager
A. Ta t s A
A. That is, e(sG, sG, xH) > (sB, G, xH); and e(sG SG, xL) >
e(sB, G, xL).
Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of this second effect. Because
of the payoff to imitation, even if the new information makes it more
likely that contradicting manager A will be the economically correct
decision, manager B will prefer to mimic A. As a result, decisions cannot
be made contingent on signals, and there cannot be an equilibrium where
manager B takes advantage of his private information.
As was emphasized in the previous section, the result depends on our
assumption that prediction errors are correlated across smart managers. If
the signals of smart managers are independent, Proposition 1 no longer
holds. This can be demonstrated by calculating the updating rules that
would prevail in a world of independent signals. Denoting these rules by
ei( ), and using the same Bayesian logic as before, we can derive:
(15) ei(sB, G, xH) - (sG, sG xH ) - e (sB, sB, xL) - e (G, sB xL)
2ep
2ep + (1 - 0)
(16) ei(s B , G, L) ei(sG , G , xL) Oi(s B, s B, xH ) ei(s G s B , x )
2(1 - p)
2e(1 - p) + (1 - e)
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According to equations (15) and (16), in the case of independent
signals, the labor market's assessment of firm B's manager is unrelated to
the investment decision of firm A. All that matters is absolute
correctness--investing before state xH leads to a more favorable ability
assessment than not investing before state xH. As a result, the inequality
in (14) is satisfied (with equality) and it is possible to sustain the
efficient equilibrium in which manager B's investment decisions can depend
on his private signal.
If the independence assumption is relaxed, the updating rules become a
function of firm A's investment decision, inequality (14) is violated, and
Proposition 1 holds. Thus perfect correlation of smart manager signals is
not necessary for our results--all that is needed is some correlation of
prediction errors.
Having established that continuation equilibria with signal-contingent
decisions by manager B do not exist, we now turn our attention to the
equilibria that can be supported in our model.
Proposition 2: There exists a continuation equilibrium in which
manager B always mimics manager A, investing if and only if A does. This
herding equilibrium is supported by the following 'reasonable' out of
equilibrium beliefs: i) if manager B deviates by investing when A has not,
the labor market conjectures that he observed sG; and conversely, ii) if
manager B deviates by not investing when A has, the labor market
conjectures that he observed sB.
In order to prove Proposition 2, it is necessary to show that manager
B will always find it optimal to behave as prescribed, given the beliefs
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posited. Let us consider only the case where firm A has already not
invested; the other case works exactly the same way.
If manager B follows firm A by also not investing, his revised ability
assessment will be simply equal to --there is no revision from the prior
because the equilibrium is a pooling" one, with both G and B recipients
choosing the same action.
In order for a manager B who observes B to not deviate, it must be
the case that:
(17) e e(s B, sG, xH) Prob (HIsB, sB ) + (sB' G, xL) Prob (LIsB, B )
Inequality (17) is the requirement that the payoff e to pooling exceed
the payoff to an B recipient from deviating and investing, given that out
of equilibrium beliefs are such that he will be taken to be an sG recipient
if he deviates. Direct substitution from (8), (9) and (13) verifies that
the inequality is satisfied.
In order for a manager B observing G to not deviate, the following
must hold:
(18) e > e(s B, G, xH) Prob (Hs B, sG ) + (s B , G, xL) Prob (XL sB s G)
Comparison of (17) and (18) shows that it is relatively more tempting
for manager B to deviate by investing after observing SG, as opposed to s B.
(It is in this sense that the out-of-equilibrium conjecture that a deviator
has seen sG is "reasonable.") Nonetheless, (18) reduces to:
(18') e > /(1 + );
II
- 19 -
which is clearly satisfied. Thus Proposition 2 is proved, and we have
established the existence of a herding continuation equilibrium.
It should be pointed out that there is another, perverse continuation
equilibrium in which the decisions of manager B do not depend on his
signal. In this equilibrium, manager B always contradicts manager A,
investing if and only if A has not. This equilibrium can only be supported
by the following 'unreasonable' beliefs off the equilibrium path: if
manager B deviates by investing when the equilibrium calls for him not to,
it is because he has observed SB; and if he deviates by not investing when
the equilibrium requires investment, it is because he has observed sG .
There are a number of reasons why this equilibrium is not likely to be
economically relevant. The first, noted above, is the unreasonableness of
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, where investing is associated with the
signal B and not investing is associated with sG . A second is the
inefficiency of the contradiction equilibrium relative to the herding
equilibrium--while manager B's information is not used in either, the
herding equilibrium at least has firm B behaving correctly based on the
information in firm A's actions.
The multiplicity of equilibria stems from our assumption that
investment decisions do not directly affect the manager's utility, but are
nothing more than a means of conveying information to the labor market
about the signal that the manager has observed. If the labor market
(perversely) interprets investment to mean that the manager has observed
sB , then the manager may well invest if he wishes to convince the labor
market that he has seen sB. It follows that in the current formulation of
our model, we cannot pin down exactly what actions will be taken. However,
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we can pin down how much information is revealed in equilibrium: in both
equilibria, managers' actions do not depend on their private signals and
hence convey no information.7
This reasoning suggests that the model can be altered slightly so as
to leave the herding equilibrium as the unique outcome. Suppose that
managers do not invest directly; instead, they report their signals to the
"owners" of the firm, who then make investment decisions so as to maximize
profits. Proposition then can be interpreted as saying that there is no
equilibrium where manager B can be relied on to make informative reports.
Given that he cannot learn anything from his manager, the owner of firm B
will then have to rely on the only available information, the action of
firm A. The unique profit-maximizing decision for the owner of firm B is
thus to always mimic firm A.
In sum, then, the contradiction equilibrium is probably not a sensible
one. If one dismisses it, the herding equilibrium is left as the unique
continuation equilibrium of the game. It remains only to establish that
the efficient behavior on the part of manager A that has been assumed to
this point is part of an overall equilibrium.
Proposition 3: There exists an equilibrium for the overall game where
manager A invests if and only if he receives G , and where manager B always
mimics manager A regardless of B's signal.
In the proposed equilibrium, there is no information inherent in
manager B's actions, since he always does the same thing, regardless of his
signal. Thus manager A can only be evaluated absolutely--his revised
III
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ability can be a function of just his action and the realized state. The
updating rules are therefore identical to those given for the two manager,
independent signal case in equations (15) and (16). That is:
^A b(19) O A(sG, xH) - A(s B , xL) - 2p/(2ep + (1 - 0)); and
(20) A(sG, xL) - 0A(sB, xH) - 2(1 - p)/(2e(1 - p) + (1 - )).
In order for manager A to be willing to invest after observing G and not
invest after observing B, the following two conditions must hold:
(21) A(sG, H)/G + A(s G , L)( - G) > o ( B , XH)PG + (sB, L)( - G);
(22) A(sB, xH)PB + A(sB, XL)( - B) > A (sG, H);B + A(sG, L)( -
From equations (5) and (6), we can obtain the simplification:
G (1 - B) - Op + (1 - ) > . The inequalities can then be verified,
which proves that manager A's behavior is part of an equilibrium.
c) Discussion
The herding equilibrium derived above will be inefficient relative to
the first-best for some configurations of private information, except in
the knife-edge case where H + xL - 0. For example, if xH + xL > 0, then
the equilibrium will be inefficient when manager A observes B, manager B
observes G; and neither firm invests.
If managers place some weight on expected profits in their objective
functions, these inefficiencies can disappear, depending on the value of
xH + xL. Continuing with the above example, for any fixed weight on
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profits, if xH + xL is large enough, the efficient signal-dependent
equilibrium will exist. On the other hand, if xH + xL is small enough (but
still above zero) even a very large weight on profits will not be
sufficient to restore the efficient equilibrium. In this sense, if
managers care some about expected profits, the more egregious
inefficiencies associated with herd behavior can be alleviated, though not
eliminated in all situations.
It should be emphasized that our results concerning herd behavior
generalize to any number of managers. The logic behind this fact can be
seen by considering a third manager C, who moves after A and B, but before
the state of the economy is realized. Since we have established that in a
two-manager herding equilibrium, manager B's actions are independent of his
signals, manager C learns nothing from observing what firm B has done. He
learns only from observing firm A, where actions do depend on the signal
received. Thus manager C is in exactly the same position as manager B
before him, and the same arguments can be used to show that he too cannot
make his actions contingent on his private information. This line of
reasoning can be applied repeatedly to any number of subsequent managers.
A final point to note is that herd behavior can have adverse effects
on the incentives for information acquisition. Although it was not
explicitly included in our model, one can imagine a preliminary stage where
managers have to expend effort to become informed. Since herding
considerations will diminish the value of any information acquired, there
will be less motivation to gather information in the first place.
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IV. Implications of the Model
The theoretical model developed above has implications in a number of
different areas. In order to give a feeling for some of the potential
applications, we discuss a few examples.
a) Corporate Investment
Bank lending to LDC's was mentioned earlier as an apparent instance of
herd behavior in corporate investment. A recent paper by Morck, Shleifer
and Vishny (1988) suggests that the problem may be more widespread. They
study the effectiveness of boards of directors in dealing with poorly
managed firms. Their principal empirical finding is that top management
firings are primarily associated with poor performance of a firm relative
to its industry, rather than with industry-wide failures. They interpret
these results as evidence that boards have a difficult time assigning blame
to their managers for mistaken strategies, when other firms in the industry
are following similar strategies.
Excessive investment in businesses that should be shrinking is a
commonly cited example of such an industry-wide mistake -- for instance, in
the oil industry, managers kept up costly explorations for additional
reserves in spite of falling oil prices (see, e.g., Jensen (1986)). The
Morck-Shleifer-Vishny evidence, which implies that managerial talent
assessment seems to be done on a relative basis, provides a plausible story
for how such ill-conceived investment plans can be sustained across an
entire industry. Any given manager will, even if he feels the investment
to be excessive, be more positively disposed towards it when all his
colleagues are doing the same thing.
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b) The Stock Market
Herd behavior by money managers could provide a partial explanation
for excessive stock market volatility. By mimicking the behavior of others
(i.e., buying when others are buying, and selling when others are selling)
rather than responding to their private information, members of a herd
will tend to amplify exogenous stock price shocks. In a sense, the ideas
developed here can be thought of as providing the microfoundations" for
stock market phenomena that are often thought to stem from psychological
sources such as groupthink," mass euphoria or panic, etc.
It should be pointed out, however, that the model of this paper does
not fit perfectly into a stock market setting, due to the assumption of
perfectly elastic supply and the consequent lack of a market clearing
price. Adding pricing considerations would complicate the formal analysis
considerably. Nonetheless, we think that our basic insights do carry over
to the stock market. At any given level of prices, major money managers
are likely to have an idea about the extent to which their competitors are
"in" the market. If this is the case, there is the possibility that money
managers will mimic each others' asset allocation strategies -- upon
observing that manager A has 50Z of his assets in stocks and 50Z in bonds,
manager B may aim for a similar portfolio composition, even when his
private information suggests that current price levels are too low or too
high. Thus one testable implication of our model is that the asset
allocation decisions of professional money managers should be more closely
correlated over time than the decisions of equally active private investors
who are unconcerned about their reputations.
Shiller and Pound (1986) present some evidence that can be viewed as
consistent with the existence of herd behavior in the stock market. They
surveyed institutional investors to determine the factors that went into
III
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their decision to buy a particular stock. Purchase of stocks that had
recently had large price runups tended to be motivated by the advice of
others (other investment professionals, newsletters, etc.). This
contrasted with more stable stocks, where fundamental research (a
systematic search procedure for a security with certain characteristics)
played a more important role. This seems to suggest that the comfort
inherent in following common wisdom can lead professional money managers to
invest in stocks where fundamentals might dictate otherwise.
c) Decisionmaking within Firms
Recent work on the theory of the firm by Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986)
has emphasized the role of managers as information filters. They argue
that firms may organize themselves internally in such a way as to take
maximum advantage of the fact that different managers will tend to have
imperfectly correlated errors of judgment. Thus there may be benefits to
having decisions made by committees, or through a vertical chain of command
where projects can be rejected at various points along the way.
Our model points up certain limitations that may be inherent in group
decisionmaking, and also offers some new insights about how organizational
structure can facilitate the decisionmaking process. As a stylized
example, consider the case of a capital budgeting committee meeting, where
the gathered managers are supposed to vote in turn on a proposed investment
project. Ideally, the point of having several managers vote is to gather a
wide range of information. Unfortunately, if career concerns are present,
this may not work well. Once the first manager has voted, the others may
simply echo his choice, regardless of their private beliefs. Thus a false
consensus is achieved, and the information of the other managers is wasted.
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One way to mitigate this problem would be to have those with the
stronger career concerns vote first. If the committee consists of young
and old executives, the young ones should be asked to voice their opinions
before the old ones, since there is presumably more uncertainty about their
ability and hence a greater temptation for herd behavior. Old executives,
on the other hand, should be more willing to express contrarian views.
More generally, this line of reasoning implies an advantage to a bottom
up," rather than top down" organization of information flow within a firm.
To the extent that new ideas or project suggestions can be passed upstream
for approval, this may result in better decisionmaking than if the ideas
are originated at a high strategic planning level and then are passed
downstream for line manager input.
Our model is consistent with observed differences in the
decisionmaking processes of Japanese and U.S. firms. Abegglen and Stalk
(1985) document the following three facts: (i) labor mobility is lower in
Japan than in the U.S.; (ii) earnings differentials between the highest and
lowest paid employees are lower in Japan; and (iii) decisionmaking is more
participative in Japan--more employees are consulted in the process.
According to our model, the first two observations should imply the third:
to the extent that reputational concerns in the labor market are not as
important in Japan, valuable information can be more readily elicited from
all employees.8
V. Conclusions
Herd behavior can arise in a variety of contexts, as a consequence of
rational attempts by managers to enhance their reputations as
decisionmakers. This behavior introduces an element of extrinsic
arbitrariness (or animal spirits") to market outcomes. As we have seen,
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these outcomes can depend critically on the order in which managers with
different pieces of information make their investment decisions. Since
this ordering is completely an artifice of the model, the fundamental
economic conclusion is that these are effectively multiple equilibria --
there can be more than one outcome associated with a given economy-wide
information set.
Other recent papers have also examined models with the Keynesian
feature of multiple equilibria in investment -- see, e.g., Weitzman (1982),
Shleifer (1986), and Shleifer and Vishny (1988). These authors emphasize
the roles of increasing returns and/or aggregate demand spillovers as
sources of multiplicity. In contrast, we find that there may be
indeterminacy in investment even in the absence of such factors.
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III
Footnotes
1In Holmstrom's (1982) example where talent is related to the ability to
make good decisions, there can be inefficiencies with only one manager.
This follows from his assumption that the outcome of a potential investment
project is unobservable when the investment is not undertaken. Our model
differs in that the state of the world that determines investment
profitability is always observable. Hence there would be no inefficiencies
in a single-manager setting.
2An analogy to noisy rational expectations models of the stock market (such
as Hellwig (1980)), where all the players move simultaneously, may be
helpful. In these models, traders also put some weight on information
drawn from the investment decisions of others (which are reflected in the
stock price) and some weight on their private information. The question we
address here is whether too little weight is put on private information in
making decisions.
3The basic idea about manipulation of the learning process was first
developed by Holmstrom (1982). Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) apply the
concept and refer to it as "signal jamming."
4This will be the case if the manager's investment decision in the second
go-round of the investment does not depend on e; the manager invests if and
only if he observes the good signal. This condition is analogous to that
posited for the first go-round in inequality (7).
5Our simplified formulation would be most literally applicable to
situations where the state is publicly observable, but cannot be verified
by the courts, so that profit-contingent contracts are not feasible. (For
more discussion of this point, see Hart and Holmstrom (1987).) This may be
a reasonable assumption for certain types of jobs where there are no easily
describable performance measures, but it will not be valid in other cases,
e.g., portfolio management.
6It is important to keep in mind that the only private information of the
manager is about the signal he observes, not about his ability. Hence the
"separation' is with respect to this signal.
7The structure of our model is similar in many respects to Crawford and
Sobel's (1982) 'cheap talk" model of strategic information transmission.
In their framework, an informed party (the sender' sends a costless
message to another party (the receiver') who then takes an action that
affects the utility of both parties. Similarly, in our model, the informed
manager (sender) makes an investment decision (sends a costless message)
and the labor market (receiver) pays a wage that affects both parties'
utilities. What matters in these models is not the actual wording of the
messages, but rather how they are interpreted by the receiver. Hence, it
is impossible to determine exactly what words will be sent, though it is
possible to determine how much information is contained in these words.
8These facts are cited in Milgrom and Roberts (1988) to support a different
theory, one based on the costs of influence activities.
